In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Impeachment Standard
In May of 1986, Nevada District Chief Judge Harry E. Claiborne of Las Vegas began serving a two-year sentence in an Alabama federal penitentiary for tax fraud, making him the first sitting federal judge in American history to be imprisoned. 2 Despite the impracticability of fulfilling his judicial duties from prison, 3 Claiborne refused to resign, vowing to return to the bench after serving out his sentence. 4 In fact, he retained his post, and his $78,700 annual salary, for five months of his prison term. s This situation -apparently both irrational and entirely legalcould develop because the Constitution explicitly provides only one way to remove article III judges 6 from office: impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction by two-thirds of the Senate. 7 In practice, this legislative impeachment procedure is intricate and may be impeached. The recently escalating use of these usually inactive provisions has reignited a debate regarding their implementation which has lain dormant since articles of impeachment were brought by the U.S. House against President Nixon in 1974. 23 Congress' response has been a cry for legislative action to prevent future "Claibornes," centering on the possibility of a constitutional amendment. 24 Congress may be too late, however, to avert such a situation at least once more, given Judge Nixon's pledge not to resign. 25 Yet Congress' approach to the current problem overlooks historical prescriptions, looking forward before looking back. The fact that Claiborne can be imprisoned before he is impeached does not reflect poor constitutional drafting requiring remedial attention by modern legislatures. In fact, the call for a constitutional amendment ignores a longstanding interpretation of the Constitution whereby judges must be impeached before they are prosecuted and/or imprisoned. This tradition is firmly grounded in the policy goals behind the impeachment provisions. The sudden eschewal of the impeachment-before-prosecution tradition is arguably the real catalyst behind Claiborne's untenable situation.
This Note explores the traditional interpretation of the Constitution's impeachment provisions in light of the demands of Judges Claiborne's, Nixon's, and Hastings' cases. Part I describes the signals indicating analytical shortcomings, and thus the need for reexamination of the provisions as currently construed. It shows that the troubling results of the recent standard allowing criminal prosecution before impeachment are apparent to both the courts and the Congress. Part II analyzes the meaning and purpose of the constitutional language, and the recent policy challenges to it. This part shows that, in fact, the impeachment provisions were carefully chosen by the Constitution's drafters, who recognized the conflict between preservation of an independent judiciary and the need to expeditiously remove miscreants. The impeachment provisions were designed to be cumbersome, in order to protect judicial decisionmaking autonomy. To the Framers, mandating an intricate process for the removal of federal judges seemed a small price to pay to ensure the American populace an independent judiciary. 23 . See, e.g.. REPORT [Vol. 86:420 Part III juxtaposes the recent treatment of judges against Part H's constitutional analysis. It reveals that the current prosecution-beforeimpeachment practice disregards goals of the judicial independence that spawned the constitutional impeachment provisions. This Note shows that, even in the context of today's large complex judiciary, the values protected by the impeachment standard are too important to be sacrificed as they are when the standard is neglected. That is to say, moves to amend the Constitution or alternatively the Senate impeachment procedures 26 are overbroad. In the haste to bring an occasional bad judge to trial more efficiently, reformers have forgotten to ask whether the incremental benefits of effectively dismantling the impeachment protections are worth the damage caused to the entire judicial system.
I. THE SUSPECT NATURE OF THE PROSECUTION-BEFORE-IMPEACHMENT STANDARD
Looking only at Judges Claiborne's, Nixon's, and Hastings' trials, it would appear that prosecuting a federal judge before impeaching him is accepted practice in lower federal courts. Actually, the practice developed less than fifteen years ago. In 1973, Seventh Circuit Judge Otto Kerner, Jr. was the first sitting federal judge to be subjected to criminal prosecution. 27 In its decision denying Judge Kemer's application to stay his prosecution, United States v. Isaacs, 28 the Seventh Circuit held that whereas the Constitution did not expressly forbid the criminal prosecution of federal judges, and whereas precedent established that Members of Congress could be criminally prosecuted prior to their expulsion from the Senate, federal judges could be indicted and tried before impeachment. 29 Isaacs has become the precedential foundation for the modem prosecution-before-impeachment trend. However, the results that follow in the Hastings need for additional judicial examination. 31 The most troubling aspect of prosecuting a judge before impeaching her is not the prosecution standing alone, but an important pragmatic consequence: she may be convicted and imprisoned. Because a judge cannot hear her docket from prison, jailing her arguably removes her from office without benefit of the constitutionally mandated impeachment procedure. Though an imprisoned judge may retain her pay and the trappings of office, the loss of her substantive responsibilities -i.e., her decisionmaking powers -deprives her of "holding" her article III "office" just as effectively as an impeachment conviction would. Admittedly, no judge may be appointed to replacs her while in prison, but the practical effect on her -the stripping of her judicial authority -is identical to that of impeachment.
Ninth Circuit Judge Kozinski recognized that this dilemma was created by Claiborne's situation:
In affirming [Claiborne' s conviction], the [court] cited ... two cases, which dealt with whether Claiborne could be prosecuted, concluding that Claiborne could ... be imprisoned. Since prosecution does not remove Claiborne from the District of Nevada or necessarily interfere with performance of judicial function, while imprisonment does, I do not think the issues are identical. 3 2
The Claiborne majority's failure to address whether an article III judge may be imprisoned before impeachment renders the court's holding a near non sequitur. A law student's "brief" of United States v. Claiborne would be almost comical:
Issue: Does imprisonment of a sitting article III judge amount to an unconstitutional removal from office without impeachment?
Holding: Article III judges may be prosecuted before impeachment.
Early in Claiborne's proceedings, the Ninth Circuit could have relied completely on Isaacs, 33 which did not present the situation of an imprisoned judge, to rule against Claiborne. For example, when he moved to quash his indictment, 34 Claiborne did not face imminent imprisonment; thus, his case was very close to Judge Kerner's. However, the Ninth Circuit issued two more opinions after Claiborne's conviction, first affirming the District Court's decision to convict 35 and then denying a stay of execution of sentence. 36 Neither opinion deals with 31 . For a detailed discussion of the Hastings [Vol. 86:420 the question of whether incarceration of an article III judge constitutes removal from office. 37 The Supreme Court has never ruled on this issue. 38 Thus, without so much as a majority opinion mention of the word "imprison," Claiborne stands as "good" case law for the proposition that article III judges may be prosecuted and imprisoned before they are removed from office. What prompted the Ninth Circuit to act as if the imprisonment issue did not exist? The answer points to a conundrum that was too late to resolve once Claiborne was convicted.
The Claiborne decision may actually reflect that the Ninth Circuit faced an impossible political quandary. For them to rule that Claiborne had to be impeached before being imprisoned even though a jury had convicted him might look as if they were bestowing preferential treatment upon a felonious colleague. 39 Thus, even if a close examination of the constitutional merits of the issue would have required them to reverse Claiborne's conviction, they would have been hardpressed to do so.
This observation is all too poignant, because the political dilemma faced by the Claiborne court may be one of the very conflicts that the impeachment provisions were designed to avoid. 40 As long as the defendant is impeached, and therefore a former federal judge by the time she is tried in court, judges will not be required to preside at the trial of their peers. 41 Thus, the dilemma could have been avoided if Claiborne had been impeached before he was prosecuted and convicted. Under the current prosecution-before-impeachment standard, judges cannot realistically rule a colleague's imprisonment improper even if they feel it is because it would seem corrupt, no matter how well-founded in doctrine. An interpretation of constitutional language which not only circumvents an important issue (here, imprisonment) but also creates this "catch-22" signals analytical defects.
A common way around this political quandary is for the accused judge to resign before any judicial proceedings. Of the fifty-five judges 37. Nor did Justice Rehnquist address the issue in his one-and-a-half page opinion (sitting alone in his capacity as Ninth Circuit Justice) affirming the denial of Claiborne's motion to stay criminal proceedings pending determination of the constitutionality of his prosecution. or not to issue articles of impeachment. If articles were issued, the judge would be tried before the Senate.
It is not clear why, after nearly two centuries of accusing judges in the House of Representatives, prosecutors began to regularly bring charges against judges in courts of law in 1973. 48 This unexplained retreat from the impeachment-first practice fuels suspicions about the new standard that were initially raised when the Ninth Circuit attempted to brush aside the practical effects of the change. Yet the current congressional response to the new "prosecution first" standard may be the clearest signal that, constitutionally, something is wrong.
Each invocation of the onerous impeachment process 49 has prompted numerous calls for some type of reform. 50 The current re- Following Judge Hastings' trial, Congress again attempted to make judicial discipline more efficient by giving the Judicial Councils more prerogative to discipline their judges for "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts." 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(l) (1982) . Each Judicial Council is composed ofa number of the circuit's active formers' thrust is unusual, however, in that legislative impeachment proposals have usually been for statutory supplements to the impeachment removal power. 51 In contrast, recent legislative focus has been primarily on the need to amend the Constitution. 52 On August 12, 1986, the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on two proposed constitutional amendments. Both proposals "provide for automatic removal of federal officers upon conviction of a felony and exhaustion of all direct appeals." 53 However, the hearing was dominated by testimony urging rejection of the amendments. 58 Two witnesses, a federal court of appeals judge and a law professor, 59 urged that the admitted defects in the existing provisions do not warrant the extraordinary remedy of a constitutional amendment. 60 The fact that the Senators advocate this "extraordinary remedy" is indicative of their awareness of the uniqueness of this problem.
More significantly, advocacy of the amendment answers one question by raising numerous others. First, it indicates that some Members of Congress assume impeachment to be an exclusive constitutional procedure for removing federal judges, 61 sive, there would be no need to amend the document to provide for an alternative method.62
Second, and more importantly, given that imprisonment of an article III judge likely constitutes an alternative form of removal, 63 the call for an amendment can be seen as an effort to mold the Constitution to the case law rather than vice versa. Though this process may not actively trouble Members of Congress, it must heighten concerns about the prosecution-first standard: If the prosecution-first cases could be reconciled with the Constitution as it stands, an amendment to the document would be redundant.
Finally, consider this last point together with the practical difficulties inherent in the constitutional amendment process. It is very difficult for any amendment to be ratified. 64 A failed amendment could actually exacerbate the current controversy by drawing attention to the shortcomings of the prosecution-before-impeachment standard, but then leaving the troublesome procedure in place. That is, when Congress leaves us with the admittedly problematic prosecutionbefore-impeachment standard, what happens next? Once again, we will be left wondering whether Congress is trying to remedy a situation it has not clearly identified. By focusing only on the inefficiency of allowing a jailed article III judge to continue to draw his salary before impeachment, Congress overlooks the fundamental question of whether the Constitution actually mandates (let alone allows) such a system. Part II will explore answers found in the Constitution's text, original intent, and modern policy and consequences.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD: EXCLUSIVITY

A. The Text
Nowhere does the Constitution say that impeachment is the only way to remove a federal judge. Ironically, the only mention of the word "impeachment" in article III is in the provision barring jury trials in cases of impeachment. 64. Article V of the U.S. Constitution requires ratification by three-fourths of the states for approval of any amendment, after either approval by two-thirds of both houses of Congress, or application for a Constitutional Convention by two-thirds of the states' legislatures. Since the adoption of Article V, only 26 of approximately 5,000 proposed constitutional amendments have been added to the document. Five others were adopted by Congress but not ratified by the states. M. BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED -POLITICS, WOMEN'S RIGHTS, AND THE AMENDING PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1986). Berry's book illustrates that the "deliberately ... difficult" constitutional amendment process, id. at 4, renders passage of an amendment arduous. Thus, it took fifty-seven years from its first introduction in Congress for the thirteenth amendment ending slavery to be ratified, id. at 10, and the Equal Rights Amendment was rejected by a slim three state margin (of thirty-eight required) after a decade-long ratification fight.
65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see note 7 supra.
[Vol. 86:420 peachment is not the sole constitutional remedy for judicial removal, then it does not matter whether imprisonment is tantamount to removal from office. Imprisonment could be one of several legitimate alternative removal methods to impeachment.
Nonetheless, the "verdict of history" 66 is that impeachment is the only way to remove article III judges from office, despite the ambiguities and contradictions in the constitutional language. 67 Even clear definitions of "high crimes" and "good behavior" would not completely resolve the "hiatus" dilemma, which is usually argued in the context of whether impeachment is the exclusive constitutional judicial removal method. If impeachment is an exclusive remedy, then there is no process by which a judge can be disciplined for mere "bad behavior," because she cannot be impeached for anything short of "high crimes." For the argument that thus construing impeachment as exclusive would render the "good behavior" clause impotent, therefore the existence of separate clauses presupposes the existence of alternatives for removal other than that impeachment is nonetheless the sole removal method, and was intended to be used spar· ingly).
Other scholars and some courts, relying on Alexander Hamilton's Statement, supra, assert that "good behavior" only defines judicial tenure, and does not address the issue of what qualifies never been much doubt that the Framers intended judges to be considered "civil officers" 68 subject to impeachment under article II, section 4, 6 9 but the argument that impeachment should be an exclusive removal method has been the subject of extensive scholarly debate.
The context of this debate is illuminating. To the Framers, impeachment and removal were not always identical. In fact, there were a number of alternative removal methods that the Framers could have adopted, but did not. In English law, impeachment was one of several ways to remove public officials from office, but was differentiated from the others in that it had a unique technical meaning which disqualified defendants from holding future office. 70 The early eighteenth-century English constitutional system contained procedures allowing for removal of judges by any of the three branches of government. Parliament could remove through their choice of impeachment, bill of attainder, or address to the King. The King initially could remove the judges of the superior courts (Exchequer, King's Bench, and Common Pleas) through language giving the judge tenure durante bene placito (1914)). This argument also understands "good behavior" to expect a higher level of conduct than is expected from the ordinary citizen, but does not see a conflict between the two standards. Instead, it sees impeachment as a mechanism by which judges can be removed from office for violations of the "good behavior" standard even if they would not be subject to other sanctions, [Vol. 86:420 (during good pleasure, i.e., at the King's will), though he lost removal power in 1701 under the Act of Settlement, from which time judges were to be appointed quamdiu se bene gesserint (during good behavior). Finally, the judiciary itself could oust an errant superior court judge through writ of scire facias, and inferior court judges by quo warranto. The United States Constitution specifically retained some of these elements, i.e., the impeachment process and the "good behavior" standard, while it overtly rejected the bill of attainder. 71 The full impact of the exclusivity argument can be understood only upon recognition that, to the Framers, removal did not mean only impeachment. Although the consequences of the various removal procedures were the same as applied to an individual judge -being stripped of judicial authority and salary -the circumstances under which each procedure would be appropriate depended on the nature of the allegation against the judge. Consolidating all judicial removals under the impeachment umbrella was a striking departure from English precedent. 72 Possibly the most thorough exposition of the constitutional interpretation insisting that impeachment is the only way to remove federal judges was made by Judge Merrill E. Otis in A Proposed Tribunal: Is It Constitutional? 13 Noting that the Framers gave the House the "sole power of impeachment," 74 and the Senate the "sole power to try all impeachments," 75 Judge Otis continued, The Framers certainly would not have been so meticulous in the use of words, so careful to use this particularly strong word in the vesting of the impeachment power, unless they had in mind ... to make it clear to all forever that, in the American system, no significance should be given to any English precedent, ifthere were any, whereby the power to charge misconduct for the purpose of obtaining removal of a civil officer from office was held to lodged in any other than that legislative body directly representing the whole people. 76 The crux of Otis' argument is that the removal power rests solely with the House and the Senate, and cannot be delegated to any other body, administrative or judicial, within the boundaries set by the constitu Proponents of the argument that impeachment is not an exclusive method for removing federal judges are quick to point out, quite rightly, that Judge Otis argues around the problem. He proves merely that Congress has the sole right to bring and try impeachments, but he begs the question of whether impeachment is the "sole" means of removal. 78 Thus, Otis' logic is not entirely convincing. Though his view enjoys some scholarly support, 79 most literature endorses an approach allowing for removal other than by impeachment alone. 80 Yet, as mentioned, Judge Otis still trumps, if only by universal acquiescence to his position. 8 82. Neither does anyone suggest that Claiborne should repay any salary for the period during which he was imprisoned before his impeachment. In 1983, just one year after it denied Judge Hastings a stay of his criminal prosecution, the Eleventh Circuit specifically addressed this ancillary issue. In Bergen v. Edenfield, 701 F.2d 906 (11th Cir. 1983), the court dismissed a suit where plaintiff sought a declaration that a federal judge had vacated his office, and sought return of all compensation received for the period during which his duties were neglected. The dismissal was based partially on the fact that there was "simply no legal basis for th[e] suit." 701 F.2d at 908 ("The only mechanism for removal of a federal judge provided in the Constitution is the impeachment process."). 6 "sole power to try impeachments" meant that "no other tribunal should have any jurisdiction of the cases tried under the provisions with reference to impeachment." 84 Ct. Cl. at 296. This reading of the clause to preclude judicial review of impeachments has not since been judicially challenged. For a discussion of why this is sound jurisprudence, see C. BLACK, supra note 67, at 53-64. But compare R. BERGER, supra note' 12, at 103-21 (disagreeing with Black 87 Although the textually-based arguments for the exclusivity of impeachment are not satisfying, the structure of the Constitution buttresses the assertion that impeachment is an exclusive removal method. Structural arguments are roughly based on the canon of construction expressio unius, exclusio alterius. Rationalizing that the impeachment provision is exclusive because it is the only judicial removal mechanism provided by the Constitution, this theory finds support from a statement by Alexander Hamilton in 1788: "This is the only provision on the point, which is consistent with the necessary independence of the Judicial character .... " 88 The expressio unius argument presumes that the Constitution is a carefully drafted document. 89 Constitutional protections were precisely apportioned among governmental branches. They afford each branch exactly the protections necessary for successful execution of that branch's unique functions. Assuming the Framers meant only what they said, it is conclusive that no methods save impeachment are mentioned for the removal of federal judges. 90 Opponents of this interpretation first point out that the Supreme Court has indicated that canons of construction are not fixed rules of Second, and more to the court's point, even if the legislative history expressly approved a sequence anticipating the criminal process first, this alone certainly would not render the congressional action constitutional. It is beyond reproach that "the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature." Marbury v. 92 The "party convicted" language arguably presupposes that any disruption of an article III judge's tenure will occur first through impeachment and only subsequently through ordinary criminal prosecution; otherwise, the past tense used -one could read "party already convicted," or "a party that has just been convicted" -would have no meaning. 93 In fact, as Justice Story pointed out long ago,94 the reason for the Framers' inclusion of the "Party convicted" clause in the Constitution may have been only "to preclude the argument that the doctrine of double jeopardy saves the offender from [a] second trial." 95 Still, it would be difficult to deny that the reference to impeachment first indicates that the Framers presumed it would have preceded criminal proceedings.
The reasons the Framers structured the impeachment power as they did become clear when contrasting the impeachment provisions against the Constitution's provisions for removal of Members of Congress. Members of Congress are not subject to impeachment, but only to expulsion by their peers. 96 They may be indicted and tried in criminal courts before they are expelled from Congress, 97 but they are pro- tected by other privileges not available to the judiciary, such as the speech and debate clause.9 8 These different protections are logical when one considers that Members of Congress, unlike article III judges, are overtly political officials. Their ability to make public statements and to have unrestricted access to legislative sessions requires protection, whereas "apolitical" article III judges instead require protection of their impartiality. Thus, Members' protections go to the exercise of political office, while it is held, through provisions guarding their speech and debate in Congress. Protecting the retention of their offices, which are periodically challenged anyway, would be foolish. 99 Meanwhile, judges require unfettered exercise of their judgments, through provisions making their removal extremely difficult. 100 If it were easy to remove federal judges, their removal could be triggered by an unpopular decision, resulting in a judiciary by majority rule.
This need for judicial protection also explains why the Constitution grants impeachment powers to Congress. Because legislative power is diffused among its many members, the legislature is theoretically the branch of government best able to winnow out frivolous charges against judges. 101 The Constitution therefore mandates that the judiciary answer only to the legislature upon misbehavior, rather than to the executive branch or other members of its own branch.
It may be true that "[t]he question whether the impeachment power is exclusive cannot be resolved by scholarship" and "an authoritative resolution can come only from the Supreme Court." 102 However, as the next section shows, the "verdict of history" requiring impeachment to remove a federal judge did not develop in a vacuum; it was a direct response to the Framers' perceived need for an independent judiciary. constitutional analysis. 103 However, the Framers' approach is relevant here because, unlike many areas of current constitutional controversy, the underlying rationales of the judicial impeachment provisionsseparation of powers and judicial independence -have not changed over time. 104 Even the Seventh Circuit, which was the first court to announce that prosecution-before-impeachment was constitutional, 105 spent the better part of a decision less than a decade later exalting judicial independence. 106 Since the framework has not changed, the constitutional history sheds light on the meaning of the vague text.
B. Original Intent
The debates at the Constitutional Convention make clear that the Framers' primary goal for the judiciary was to preserve its independence.107 The importance of this objective traces back to the colonists' resentment of the iron-fisted monarchical control of the judges in England. This is evidenced by one of the principal grievances recited in The Declaration of Independence: King George had "made judges dependent upon his will alone for the tenure of their offices and the amount and payment of their salaries. " 108 The colonists' dissatisfaction with the English system led them to adopt only those provisions which promulgated the ideal of judicial autonomy. 109 The Federalist Nos. 78 Given this basic premise, the ambiguous textual language 113 must have been intended to make impeachment the exclusive means of disqualifying misbehaving judges from retaining their duties. The cumbersome process 114 protects judges from the political backlash of their decisions. If there were an easier alternative removal method, impeachment would never be practiced, and judges would be unprotected. The policy which brought about the impeachment provision thus presupposes its exclusivity for judges. If criminal proceedings are called for, they will certainly take place after the judge is impeached, when she is therefore no longer a judge, but an ordinary (unprotected) citizen.
This argument raises an important point which merits elaboration. Designating impeachment an "exclusive" remedy for disciplining federal judges does not mean that an individual who happens to be a federal judge is immune from normal criminal punishment. All it does mean is that, while the individual retains her office, impeachment is the only disciplinary option available. After she is stripped of her duties through an impeachment conviction, she will clearly "nevertheless be liable" to criminal prosecution. 115 Thus, calling impeachment an "exclusive" remedy is somewhat misleading in that it is only accurate when thinking about judges as judges, not as private citizens once they are no longer in office. A more precise description, then, would be that the needs of judicial independence require an "impeachment first," not an "impeachment only" standard.
The Framers' recognition of the need to protect the judiciary's independence was all too accurate. Today's judges frequently find that 111. "(T]he Judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the com· munity. The Legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The Judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse .. 114. As described by Lord Bryce, "Impeachment ... is the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use. It ..• needs complex machinery to bring it into position, an enormous charge of powder to fire it, and a large mark to aim at." J. BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 208 (1891). they have to cope with "dramatic litigation in which [they find themselves] confronted with the need to decide an explosive issue" and the attendant "risk[s] of unpopularity." 116 The Constitution's complex impeachment design, and its requirement of a two-thirds majority of the Senate for conviction, ultimately protects citizens by ensuring their judges do not make political decisions in order to preserve their own tenure in office. This is as important today as it was when the constitutional language was drafted.
This policy of judicial independence is risky because of its all-tooeasy disintegration into judicial mayhem. Not only is the policy highly exploitable by unscrupulous judges, but there is also a troublesome inadequacy regarding the removal of intellectually, but not morally, disabled judges. The Constitution's drafters were aware of the risks of complicating judicial removal, but they saw the approach as the least subject to abuse among their alternatives. As Hamilton put it,
The want of a provision for removing the Judges on account of inability, has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible, that such a provision would either not be practised upon, or would be more liable to abuse, than calculated to answer any good purpose .... An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of ability and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal and party attachments and enmities, than advance the interests of justice, or the public good. The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification. 117 The Framers thus anticipated more danger of abuse from politicking than from impediments to removing incompetent judges. This assumption is empirically supported by the fact that a third of those threatened with impeachment have resigned (rather than suffer the entire process), and an "undetermined number ... resigned upon mere threat of inquiry." 118 Fundamentally, the Framers seem to have decided that, despite hazards, any other rule would encourage the political manipulation to which Claiborne claims he was subjected. 119 The potential problem of corruption in the judiciary is more diffi- It has been argued that Hamilton's reference to insanity being a "virtual disqualification" implies that "he must have believed that an insane judge could be removed from the bench other than by im· peachment." Note, The Chandler Incident, supra note 67, at 463. However, it is equally conceivable that Hamilton believed that an insane judge would either be "physically unable to sit in his official capacity," id. at 464, or, more likely, that insanity would clearly be grounds for impeachment.
118. J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 204. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text. But see Stolz, supra note 102, at 667 (pointing out that the threat of impeachment itself may be a coercive weapon, since there are many potential reasons for resignations besides guilt, e.g.. the fact that the "impeachment procedure does not look fair").
119. See note 200 infra.
[Vol. 86:420 cult than that of incompetency. One valid criticism of the impeachment process envisions dishonest judges exploiting the impracticability of their removal. 120 Judges Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon may be examples of this phenomenon. Even more troubling is the potential horror of the judge who commits a violent crime: there may be problems ensuring the defendant's speedy trial.121 However, these concerns must be weighed against the "long run advantages of an independentjudiciary." 122 Where one draws the line demarcating "enough" and "too much" judicial independence turns largely on one's view of the honesty of the judiciary. If one believes, as does Justice Stevens, that "virtually all of [the life-tenured federal judges] are rendering judicial service that is entitled to the highest respect,"123 then one is likely comfortable with the odds of the Framer's gamble. 124 They apparently felt that the overall benefits of ensuring an independent judiciary outweighed the possibility of requiring extraordinary steps, and extra time, to oust the rare miscreant. Even if one believes that judicial corruption will be far more frequent than Justice Stevens supposes, the objective of an independent judiciary may still prevail, because, as noted, impeachment never immunizes the individual from criminal proceedings. 125 Requiring an impeachmentfirst approach costs society only a delay of the criminal proceedings, 126 whereas the price of a prosecution-first standard could be to undermine completely the protections from political coercion afforded judges by the impeachment process. One could imagine a new President from one political party summarily disposing of the judicial appointments of her predecessor (from the other political party) by employing the Justice Department to find and bring criminal charges against judges. Ultimately, the Framers decided that it was worth the cost of delaying valid criminal proceedings to avoid the higher costs associated with the filing of frivolous ones. 126. In the fictional extreme case in which a judge committed a crime, such as mass murder, where society's safety mandated her immediate incarceration, common sense would dictate that public safety considerations would overwhelm procedural ones and thus allow her confinement until an undoubtedly hurried Congress could impeach her.
Separation of Powers
The issue underlying judicial independence is the separation of powers doctrine. 127 The impeachment provisions are an exercise in the careful balancing of powers. It provided a way to remove judges, because their absolute independence would have been open to abuse. But it protected the judiciary, which was clearly vulnerable to having its operations disrupted by the other branches of government. In addition to the potential for coercion of judicial decisionmaking, 12 s judicial stability required protection from the political winds of change. Put another way, the Framers wanted to preclude each new President from summarily dismissing his predecessors' judges and appointing his own. 129 Given this goal, effectively vesting removal powers in Department of Justice prosecutors may be the very worst choice; yet the prosecution-first standard does just that. 130 The Framers chose a pragmatic compromise by vesting removal responsibilities in Congress. Although the Senate is criticized today as too large to make just decisions 131 and overwhelmingly disinterested in the impeachment process (rendering attendance at impeachment trials abysmal), 132 Congress is the only governmental branch with any intrinsic checks on frivolous or vindictive accusations. Unlike other branches, the legislature's power does not rest in the hands of one individual, but is diffused across a large, representative body. 133 Even if bad faith charges were filed by one Member of Congress, other Members' votes would theoretically blunt their impact, either through rejection of the charges or through failure to obtain the two-thirds Senate majority needed for conviction.
Furthermore, the argument goes, impeachment is a high profile process. Once charges are filed, investigation of their validity and the [Vol. 86:420 trials themselves consume a disproportionate block of scarce Senate time. Because Members of Congress continually face reelection contests, and negotiate with other Members, no self-preserving Representative would introduce charges unless she were thoroughly convinced of their legitimacy. 134 Of course, there is often political hay to be made through the filing of impeachment charges. 135 Yet neither the executive nor the judicial branch features the dispersion of power among many members that distinguishes the legislature. Thus, while no governmental branch staffed by human beings is politically infallible, the legislature retains an intrinsic check against abuse that does not exist in either of the other branches.
Protection of the Office
Having said all this, one point must be clarified. It is somewhat inappropriate to be discussing the Framers' intent regarding judicial impeachment. While, as discussed, the original vision of the tenure of the judiciary and its "political" role vis-a-vis the other branches of government were debated at length, judicial removal was not of major concern to the Framers. 1 3 6 The impeachment debates at the Constitutional Convention focused mainly on removal of the executive; the impeachment provisions were "intended" to check presidential, not judicial, activity . 131 This fact does not undermine the foregoing conclusions regarding the importance of judicial independence: Judicial tenure was decidedly for the life of the judge; therefore, any discussion of removal was superfluous. Nevertheless, further analysis of the intended meaning of the judicial impeachment clauses must be made by analogy to executive impeachment.
Consider, for instance, an idea suggested by Max Farrand in The Framing of the Constitution of the United States: "[W]hat is perhaps the clearest indication of intention to make the office an important one is that the executive was rendered subject to impeachment." 138 Far- 134 . See Stolz, supra note 102, at 666-67.
For example, then-Republican House Leader Gerald Ford's proposal to impeach Justice
William O. Douglas, see R. BERGER, supra note 12, at 53, 86, 94, 123; Feerick, supra note 47, at 2 & n.5, may be a high water mark in candidness regarding political motivations. Ford asserted at that time that an "impeacha.ble offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representatives considers it to be at a given moment in history," and that conviction results from those "offenses two-thirds of the other body considers to be sufficiently serious to require removal of the accused from office." 116 CONG. REC. 11913 (1970 rand's statement points to an important underlying implication: somehow the office itself, rather than the person holding the office, required the protection of an impeachment provision. Although Farrand's point was not made in the context of judicial impeachment, this perceived need for office protection can also be found in the vague "good behavior" and "high crimes and misdemeanors" language, which has been construed to mean that an action need not be indictable to be impeachable. 139 The potential need to impeach for noncriminal deeds presupposes higher expectations for the conduct of those subject to impeachment than of the average citizen. 140 Efficient government requires a mechanism for rejecting an individual occupying an office, whether the office is judicial or executive.
Requiring a higher standard of conduct for officeholders is admittedly a burden on the individual. The mere appearance of impropriety can lead to unemployment. 141 This argument can be countered, however, by the fact that it does not seem intuitively unfair to require those holding society's most responsible positions to meet higher standards commensurate with their privileges. 142 Examining the reasons that the Framers chose to protect the office at the expense of the individual reinforces the assertion that they carefully chose impeachment as the sole judicial disciplinary method. The "protection of the office" idea assumes that the power of the judiciary 142.
[A] judge may be unfit who, without being guilty of any moral obliquity, does yet, ... by overlooking the fact that the office he occupies is not a private, personal, lifelong sinecure, but an institution established to achieve the needs of society for justice through law, fail to attain that high standard of "good behavior" which should be the ideal of the judge of an enlightened society. [Vol. 86:420 rests, to a large degree, on the public's belief in its authority; as Hamilton noted in The Federalist, the judiciary cannot rely on its control of the army (as the President can), nor of the purse (as the Legislature can). 143 The maintenance of this public confidence requires that the court's dignity, its limited time and energy, and its appearance of (and actual) impartiality be carefully guarded. None may be sacrificed without jeopardizing this indispensable public confidence. 144 Impeachment furthers this end. Criminal prosecution of a sitting judge arguably soils the office as much as the individual. Preserving the integrity of the judiciary thus mandates that impeachment precede any other disciplinary proceedings. It serves to separate the person from the office, preserve the aura of the office, and, ultimately, preserve the potency of the judicial branch.
This observation helps to explain the curious irony extant when a provision developed to coerce better-than-average behavior is invoked to delay a criminal prosecution (as with Judges Claiborne and Nixon). Because the abuse of office was seen as doing damage to the office itself, impeachment was required as a separation technique. The office was too precious to be further sullied by being subjected to a criminal prosecution. Any delay in the prosecution of the individual was worth the overall benefit to the office. Impeachment could thus mitigate the damage done to the judiciary as a whole in the unfortunate situation of a miscreant judge.
C. Modern Policy: The Short-Sighted Efficiency Argument
The original ideals of preserving judicial independence and integrity remain important today, 145 yet the challenges to these ideals have become more vigorous 146 as the country, and its judicial workload, have grown. 147 Significantly, the most frequent modern challenge to 143 the impeachment process is its inefficiency. 148 However, the efficiency argument fails to counter the original concerns that created the Constitution's impeachment provisions.
The Premise
The argument operates from the premise that the constitutional standard is archaic: it did not anticipate today's plethora of federal judges. 14 9 Pragmatically, proponents reason, it has become impossible for Congress to discipline each judge individually. There are over 750 federal judges, 150 and every impeachment monopolizes weeks of limited congressional session time. 15 I If any significant number ever required discipline, the legislature could become paralyzed.15 2 Perhaps more importantly, the consequence of this inefficiency is that inadequate judges can retain their positions simply because they are so difficult to remove. 153
The efficiency proponents rationalize that while one judge may have merited this expenditure of congressional time when there were 148. Today's scholarly criticisms focus mainly on the lack of care with which Senators hear the impeachments and the ineffectiveness of the process in ensuring an honest, competent judici- 153. See notes 159-61 infra and accompanying text. In addition to the problems surrounding removal of misbehaving judges, efficiency proponents point to impeachment's ineffectiveness for removing judges for nonethical reasons, such as senility or incompetency. They argue that this may have been tolerable when Hamilton penned The Federalist, but society can no longer afford inefficacious judges. Besides, it would be ludicrous to subject an incapacitated judge to the humiliation of an impeachment proceeding.
This argument disregards the key question Hamilton addressed in The Federalist
No. 79, see text at note 117 supra: Who decides when a judge is so disabled that she should be removed?
The potential for arbitrary removal of judges by those trying to advance "personal and party attachments and enmities," id .. is the very dilemma that prompted the structuring of impeachment provisions. See Part II.B supra. The Framers affirmatively chose to err on the side of potential inefficiency, for the greater good of an unthreatened judiciary. As for debilitated judges, there is already an easily invoked alternative to impeachment: they can resign. See J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 204. Finally, the Judicial Conduct Act, supra note 50, gives the judiciary limited powers to deal with their disabled or miscreant colleagues short of removal, such as moving them to senior status. As long as these measures do not involuntarily deprive a judge of the essential duties which enable her to be a judge, they should pass constitutional muster. [Vol. 86:420 very few judges in the federal system, today's judges clearly do not.154 The argument goes that since each individual judge no longer has the influence she did when there were fewer judges, the benefits of protecting each judge's independence are diminished because of the limited impact of any one judge's decisions.
This premise is flawed. First, the underlying notion that the Framers did not anticipate the effects of population growth is debatable. Although they did not specifically discuss this at the Constitutional Convention, 155 the Framers had enough foresight to build in flexibility for other variables related to the country's expansion, such as inflation.156 In fact, as illustrated, the Framers intended impeachment to be inefficient, in order to maintain judicial stability and independence.157 Fear of society's mutations may have actually been the impetus of the constitutional impeachment provisions.
Furthermore, the Constitution has accommodated growth in many other areas without the need to alter the document or its interpretation, because the principles underlying the language were deemed too valuable to abandon. For example, the constitutional procedure regarding the appointment of the expanded judiciary is rarely criticized.15s It could be suggested that the President should not waste her scarce time appointing article III judges; or that the Senate should no longer be required to approve them; or that less than a two-thirds majority should be required for approval. Some constitutional "relics" endure because the policies that created them have not changed with time. Impeachment falls within this category.
The Theory
Even granting the premise of the efficiency argument, its theory remains questionable. By undervaluing such intangibles as the independence and integrity of the judiciary, the argument avoids the most difficult conflicts. Consider the efficiency proponents' assertion that impeachment is no longer an effective deterrent to judges contemplating malpractice. 159 They note that impeachment is so impractical that 154 . See Nunn, supra note 8, at 30-31. 155 . See text at note 136 supra. 156. As Hamilton noted in The Federalist, the Constitutional Convention chose to compen· sate the judges "at stated times" and in such a way that the compensation "shall not be dimi11· ished during their continuance in office," (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1), in lieu of providing for "permanent" salaries, because "the fluctuations in the value of money, and in the state of a society, rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the Constitution inadmissible. What might be extravagant to-day, might in half a century be penurious and inadequate. 485 (1930) .
159. This aspect of the efficiency argument seems to be an outgrowth of the frustration at the it is only employed when demanded by the most egregious judicial sins. 160 Thus, they reason, Thomas Jefferson's celebrated description of impeachment as a "bungling way of removing Judges ... an impracticable thing-a mere scarecrow," 161 evinces the irony of blindly clinging to this archaic process: rather than designing our laws to induce judges to maintain a higher standard of conduct than the average citizen, 162 we instead refuse to relinquish a procedure which effectively encourages federal judges to act illegally. Immunizing judges from criminal prosecution "is counterintuitive. It is fundamental to our system of justice that no one is above the law and that the guilty should be punished."163 Here the efficiency argument misses the point. Defenders of the impeachment standard do not assert that the guilty need not be punished, only that punishment should be subsequent to impeachment in order to preserve a procedure that protects society's competing interest in an independent judiciary. It may be true that impeachment is more difficult to achieve than a court conviction. This was, of course, intended to be so. However, once the judge is removed from office, she shall "be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punmodest number of impeachments generated by the existing system. Yet the statistical analysis carries ambiguous implications. Although 59 may seem a paltry number of judges to be investigated in national history, see notes 42-46 supra and accompanying text (and adding to Borkin's data the cases of Judges Kerner, Hastings, Claiborne, and Nixon), consider that 18 of the investigated judges relinquished their offices through their own resignations. When added to 9 impeachments, this brings the total number of judges removed to 27, nearly half of those investigated. Moreover, 22 of the 59 investigated were specifically absolved of impeachable conduct. See J. BORKIN, supra note 15, at 204. The fact that there were few impeachments does not necessarily reflect the ease with which the judiciary can avoid discipline. Note that an "undetermined" number of judges resigned upon the mere threat of inquiry. Id. The infrequency of impeachments thus could demonstrate either the effectiveness of the threat of impeachment, or even the integrity of the federal judiciary. In this context, 59 could arguably be seen as a large number of judges to be charged with violating their public trust. As Judge J. Clifford Wallace remarked before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, while defending the Judicial Councils' statistical record of activity in disciplining their judges:
[T]he success of the procedure should not be measured by the number of actions the council is required to take against judges in a given year. The process is working at its best when problem judges are corrected in a quiet and efficient manner. The problem is solved and a good judge is saved. There may not be a headline, but that should not be the mark of success.
Judge Wallace statement, supra note 58, at 12. 160. See note 114 supra ("Impeachment ... is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use.").
See I c. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 295 (1922).
While this Jefferson quote is catchy and famous, it was motivated by a specific factual setting, This is not the only area in which our justice system recognizes that competing values demand special procedures as protective exceptions to standard operating procedures. These constitutional protections enable the government to "put a thumb on the scale" on behalf of public policy interests not otherwise adequately weighed. Judge Kozinski, in his dissent from the Ninth Circuit's denial of a stay of Judge Claiborne's sentence, aptly expressed this idea:
[Although Judge Claiborne's claim of immunity] is counterintuitive ... these principles are not absolute. For example, . . . the Constitution gives Senators and Representatives immunity "for any Speech or Debate in either House." And, on occasion, the prejudicial effect of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights is so serious that a conviction must be overturned. These results, and numerous others like them, may offend our sense of justice, but they are thought to serve a purpose higher than the exigencies of a particular case. The last two centuries of constitutional adjudication should have taught us that intuition is no substitute for legal reasoning .... 165 Keeping in mind that Judge Claiborne's "counterintuitive" claim only delays his criminal prosecution, this seems a small price to pay for the constitutional protection of the entire judiciary. The efficiency argument defines its way around this problem by virtually stipulating that an independent judiciary is less valuable than an efficient society. Analysis is superfluous after this initial assignation of values.
The Manifestations
The two proposed constitutional amendments that have been the focus of recent Senate attention 166 crystallize the efficiency proponents' reaction to the Claiborne case. 167 As noted, legislative proposals to expedite the impeachment process are not novel in the face of alleged judicial improprieties. 168 These concrete manifestations, like the abstract efficiency argument which underpins them, neglect signifi- cant policy concerns in their attempt to respond rapidly to immediate political pressures. 169 The Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on the amendments 170 in which two witnesses testified, Ninth Circuit Judge J. Clifford Wallace and University of Pennsylvania Law Professor Stephen B. Burbank. 171 Both were highly critical of the amendments, focusing primarily on the fact that the current impeachment procedures are adequate to deal with the rare unlawful judge. 172 They suggested that modification of the congressional impeachment rules could expedite the process somewhat, without sacrificing constitutional intent. 173 The two witnesses pointed to numerous substantive areas in which the proposed amendments neglected "fundamental principles" the Constitution seeks to protect. 174 Not surprisingly, violation of the principles of judicial independence and the separation of powers was of particular concern. 175 Proponents of the efficiency argument sometimes compare federal impeachment procedures to state judicial removal procedures in order to illustrate the benefits of a more efficient system. Since 1960, nearly every state has broken from the traditional federal impeachment model and has enacted rules (either by statute or constitutional amendment) which create advisory commissions on judicial qualifications to investigate allegations of judicial misconduct. 176 While no [Vol. 86:420 state commission's power extends as far to actual removal of a judge from office, their recommendations to their state's removal body (usually the state supreme court) carry enormous weight. 177 The federal judicial system, it is suggested, would benefit from an expansion of Judicial Council influence to match that of the state commissions. 178
However, the alternative removal provisions used by states such as recall, executive action, election, bar association action, and judicial action 179 are subject to the selfsame political influences from which the Framers sought to protect the federal judiciary. 180 These state provisions sacrifice judicial independence, 181 which is clearly not as important to the states as it was to the writers of the federal Constitution. Indications of this are sprinkled throughout state constitutions: witness the fact that most state judges are appointed for terms and/or must periodically stand for reelection. 1 s 2 A final argument corollary to the efficiency argument denounces the impeachment process as too political. 183 This approach charges that impeachment's cumbersome inefficiency does not even achieve the desired result of preventing political attacks on the judiciary. Thus, attacks on the efficiency argument overvalue impeachment's purported benefits, because impeachment actually does not protect judges from politics. This argument points to the fact that impeachment proceedings are often brought for political reasons, 184 and the legislature is undeniably prone to political whims, despite intrinsic checks against abuse through its diffused power structure.1s 5 Critics of impeachment on this basis would be more helpful if they could suggest less political alternatives. Suggestions either focus on modification of the existing legislative impeachment proceedings so as to minimize the political nature of the process, 186 or on shifting removal power to a judicial tribunal. 187
Calls for revision of the House and Senate rules do not raise constitutional difficulties, because they implicitly accept the existing machinery. In fact, the only Senate procedural innovation rejected during Judge Claiborne's impeachment arguably was spurned because it stimulated the same constitutional problems as the proposed amendments. The innovation in question was the third article of impeachment, which allowed for impeachment conviction solely on the basis of the criminal conviction. Commenting on this article's 46 to 17 defeat, Senator Alan J. Dixon remarked that many Senators did not want "to set the precedent that a conviction would be equivalent to impeachment."188 Other modernizations of existing procedures have been suggested, including creation of a bipartisan House Committee on Judicial Fitness, with a permanent professfonal staff; and the use of special masters to conduct evidentiary hearings for the Senate. 189 These alterations may in fact help depoliticize the process, and they do not do violence to the ideal of judicial independence.
Calling for the judiciary to remove its own members is another matter, because the suggestion assumes that the judiciary will somehow be less susceptible to political motivations than the legislature. This assumption is not clearly valid. First, judges may hold biases because a defendant judge tarnishes the judiciary as a whole. This problem is partially dealt with through judges' ability to recuse themselves from cases in which they feel they could not be impartial, 190 but there is arguably no judge in the federal system who could adjudicate another judge's trial without struggling with objectivity. Conversely, the stature of Senators' offices is not diminished by the defendant judge.
Furthermore, suggestions for judicial tribunals invariably call for the tribunal members to be appointed_ by the Chief Justice of the United States. 191 Putting aside the potential for intrusion of the executive branch into these selections (and therefore the tribunal deci- [Vol. 86:420 sions), 192 the abstract notion of vesting all judicial removal decisions in a small panel of judges, each one appointed by the same person, is, to understate the case, politically charged. Under these proposals, the Chief Justice could wield more power over the makeup of the federal judiciary than the President, who selects judicial nominees. In contrast, vesting removal power in the power-diffused Congress, and requiring a two-thirds majority to convict, softens the impact of any one person. 193 Obviously, not all frivolous or vindictive accusations will be stopped in the Legislature, but it is the only branch in which these checks are possible. Although giving impeachment powers to the legislature is not a panacea, it is the best option available.
Summary
The overall inadequacy of the efficiency argument is perhaps best made in D.C. Circuit Judge Harry Edwards' concurrence in Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States:
The fact that, in practice, impeachment may be so difficult that unworthy judges are not often removed from office does not give either Congress or the judiciary license to fashion an alternative, more efficient method of dealing with the problem. "Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives -or the hallmarks -of democratic government." 194 The "primary objectives" that justify maintenance of complex impeachment machinery are concerns of judicial independence and separation of powers. Due to its unsure foundation in premise and policy, the efficiency argument does not acceptably respond to these concerns. The drive to prosecute a federal judge before impeaching her is simply another manifestation of the flawed efficiency argument. This flaw may help to explain why the Claiborne majority opinion is so unsatisfying.
III. CLAIBORNE AND HASTINGS REVISITED
A. Claiborne Judge Claiborne's is the first case to exhibit all the discussed problems with the prosecution-before-impeachment standard, both because he is the first judge to have exhausted all available judicial appeals, 195 and the first to be impeached after conviction. The Ninth Circuit majority relied heavily on precedent set in the cases of Judges Kerner 1 96 and Hastings 197 to reject Claiborne's substantive constitutional arguments against his being subject to criminal prosecution while a sitting federal judge. 198 This reliance neglected the fact that neither of these judges' cases needed to address the difficult issue of imprisoning a sitting federal judge.199 Judge Claiborne's fundamental contention was that it is unconstitutional to prosecute -and certainly to imprison -an article III judge before he is removed from office by impeachment. 200 allegations that federal law enforcement authorities were out to destroy him, and that they were engaged in a campaign of lawlessness, intimidation and deception."), with the bound volume, 790 F.2d at 1358-60 (noting that Judge Reinhardt's opinion "published in the advance sheet at this citation ... was vacated and withdrawn from the bound volume"). The particular curiosity of a judge vacating a published opinion which recounted charges of executive branch improprieties cannot be missed.
Claiborne's allegations are supported by the fact that every judge who heard his case -both in trial and on appeal -was handpicked for the purpose. 781 F.2d 1327 at 1332. Because his colleagues within his district initially recused themselves, judges were designated by Chief Justice Burger to hear Claiborne's trial and appeal. 781 F.2d at 1329-30. The purpose of recusals is to ensure defendants fair trials by enabling a potentially biased judge to not hear a case. However, Claiborne asserts that because he was the victim of a Justice Department vendetta, the recusals themselves ensured that he would not be tried fairly, 781 F.2d at 1332-33, because the procedure by which his judges were selected was unusual. Normally, the Chief Justice, under 28 U.S.C.
§ two basic supporting arguments, the first of which, relying on the constitutional language of article I, section 3, clause 7, has already been discussed at length.201 Claiborne's second line of reasoning, however, is arguably one on which the continued independence of the judiciary relies. He contended that imprisoning him while he was still an article III judge amounted to depriving him of his office, because it deprived him of his docket and all of his duties. Being so deprived before impeachment not only skirted the constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards for removal, but also created "a constitutional . . . collision between two branches of our government" by compelling a sitting article III judge "to surrender to the custody of the Attorney General, an officer of the executive branch; ... [to] be confined outside his district, disenabled from performing judicial functions." 202 If life tenure means anything at all, it is that "a judge has judicial authority unless and until that power is stripped by congressional impeachment." 203 Claiborne's argument was that since the legislature, not the executive, is charged with removing judges, the Attorney General's usurpation of the judicial removal process violates separation of powers principles. And because criminal prosecution necessarily presupposes the potential for imprisonment -a de facto removal from office -prosecution before impeachment must be prohibited. 2 04 However, the court rejected the assertion that "criminal prosecution is the equivalent of removal from office." 205 While admitting that "federal judges [can] be removed from office only by impeachment, " 206 the court resolutely resisted any suggestion that this principle might also require impeachment before prosecution. It did so by of the opportunity to be judged by those who would normally preside over his case and instead is tried and convicted before, and has his appeal heard by, judges all of whom are specially selected for their assignments. 781 F.2d 1327, 1132-33 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original, citation omitted).
The selective prosecution allegation is but a corollary to Claiborne's constitutional challenges. Nevertheless, Justice Burger's haste, when combined with his well-known ties to the executive branch administration, calls into question his own independence vis-a-vis the Justice Department, and further demonstrates the indispensability of a judiciary independent of the executive branch.
201. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text. The Claiborne majority rejected this argument by relying on Isaacs and Hastings precedent, finding Claiborne's interpretation of the "party convicted" language "tortured," and that U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 intends only to "assure that after impeachment a trial on criminal charges is not foreclosed by the principle of double analogizing to the criminal prosecution and removal of Senators. 207 The court reasoned, citing Isaacs, that since the Supreme Court settled that criminal prosecution and conviction of a Senator does not ipso facto "vacate the seat of the convicted Senator, nor compel the Senate to expel him or to regard him as expelled by force alone of the judgement, "208 neither were judges automatically removed "by force alone of the judgment."209
This analogy between judges and Senators is superficial and disregards key protections uniquely conferred on judicial officers. The constitutional provisions for tenure, protection, and removal of Senators are very different from those for article III judges, because the tenure of Members of Congress is not guided by the same concerns for independence and separation of powers that control judicial tenure. 210 For example, Senators do not enjoy article III life tenure; they may be removed from office by expulsion, 211 or may be defeated at the polls. 2 1 2
Even if the Claiborne majority's defense of the prosecution-beforeimpeachment standard had been stronger, it still would not have answered the problem of imprisonment before impeachment. The logical arguments for equating imprisonment with removal are strong: imprisoning a sitting judge deprives her of her docket, 213 removes her from her judicial district, 214 and thus constructively strips her of her office without impeachment.21 5 Most importantly, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of disenabling a judge from executing judicial duties without impeachment. Strongly worded Chandler dissents by Justices Black and Douglas have produced oft-quoted language supporting the conclusion that denying a judge her docket without impeachment is equivalent to unconstitutional removal. 221 Chandler involved a Judicial Council order that Judge Chandler " 'take no action whatsoever in any case or proceeding now or hereafter pending' in his court." 222 judges to censor or discipline any federal judge ... [or] strip him of his power to act as a judge .
. . . The power to keep a particular judge from sitting on a racial case, a church-and-state case, a free-press case, a search-and-seizure case, a railroad case, an antitrust case, or a union case may have profound consequences. Judges are not fungible.22 4 Admittedly, the only detailed language delineating the boundaries of constitutional behavior in Chandler is in these dissenting opinions. But the majority's opinion is built on an essential idea: that impeachment is the sole constitutional judicial removal method, due to the need for an independent judiciary. Unfortunately, the Claiborne court did not heed Chandler's message.
The Claiborne court also based its rejection of Claiborne's argument on the Isaacs and Hastings decisions. Though acknowledging the importance of the "salutary principles of separation of powers and judicial independence, " 225 the court nevertheless ignored the danger that "the judiciary would be subject to intolerable pressures from the executive branch if executive officers [a]re permitted to prosecute active federal judges." 226 It dismissed Claiborne's predictions of the prosecution's practical damage, such as biasing an acquitted judge against the executive branch in any subsequent suits, as "overstated. "227 Instead, the court simply restated that "Article III protections . . . should not be expanded to insulate federal judges from punishment for their criminal wrongdoing." 228 Thus the Claiborne decision depends heavily on the maxim that "no man ... is above the law." 229 This reliance is disturbing, because the truism begs the essential question. No one contends that judges are above the law. The really difficult question is when, not whether, an article III judge may be subjected to the criminal process. The court should be asking how the law can best be enforced in order to avoid damaging the constitutional system.
The "immunity" Claiborne asserted is one of process, not unlike numerous other constitutional privileges and immunities for governmental officers, 2 3° and even for indicted citizens. Constitutional pro- [Vol. 86:420 on the record in the criminal court? 244 These issues also arose in Judge Hastings' case. But they were further complicated by the fact that the trial court acquitted him, so the very fact of his acquittal gave his impeachment scenario an invidious tint: the Judicial Council looks as if it attempted to overrule a jury. It did not try to mask this objective by asserting that Hastings' criminal trial had somehow soiled his office 245 or that his judicial performance was otherwise substandard. Instead the Council charged that Hastings' criminal defense was an obstruction of justice. The Council sought to impeach him for "guilt" the jury somehow missed.
If Hastings had been impeached before his criminal trial, some may have charged that it would have seemed unfair to him, because of his acquittal. However, if he had been impeached first, the described dilemma would have been avoided. As the situation now stands, the Council's actions appear somewhat vindictive, and Judge Hastings himself is no better off than if he had been impeached before his acquittal: he still faces impeachment. 24 6 This constitutional predicament may once again be best captured by Judge Edwards, here concurring with the dismissal (for lack of ripeness) of Hastings' first challenge to the Judicial Conference's actions:
Although I have no reason to doubt the integrity of members of the federal judiciary, I am willing to assume that there may be a few corrupt judges, who dishonor their title and role in our society. This does not change my view, however, that the Constitution specifies only one procedure for disciplining them -impeachment. 247 
CONCLUSION
Until recently, impeachment was assumed to be the exclusive constitutional remedy for disciplining sitting article III judges, but this did not preclude their criminal prosecution once removed from office. A modem prosecution-before-impeachment approach, exemplified by the recent criminal convictions of Judges Claiborne and Nixon, raises a troublesome repercussion: criminal prosecutions presume the possibility of conviction and imprisonment, yet imprisoning a sitting federal judge logically removes her from her judicial responsibilities. This results in two problems: tax dollars must continue to pay large salaries to inoperative judges; and the protections afforded the entire judiciary by the impeachment process are circumvented.
Impeachment is a constitutional safeguard that protects the inde- pendence and impartiality of the judiciary. It is one of many special procedures in the Constitution for the protection of our system of government. These procedures always have costs, but their expense only reflects the value of the societal benefits preserved. The need to protect the independence and integrity of the judiciary and to preserve the separation of powers has not changed over the last two centuries. In fact, the importance of such protection is acknowledged even by those who seek to weaken it. Gerald McDowell, the Justice Department attorney who oversaw the Claiborne and Nixon prosecutions, summarizes the problem -and, ironically, its only constitutional resolution -all too well: 
